Repeated contracting allows lenders to uncover private information about their clients, decreasing the informational asymmetry between a borrower and his lender but introducing one between the lender and competing …nanciers. This paper constructs a credit-based model of production to analyze how learning through lending relationships a¤ects the monetary transmission mechanism.
Introduction
The importance of …nancial intermediation for real activity has been emphasized in the macroeconomics literature.
1 With lenders imperfectly informed about their borrowers, models such as Williamson (1987) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989) have shown how intermediation costs can propagate shocks through the credit that funds productive investment. The premise of the present paper is that, if private information creates a credit channel, then the transmission of shocks should depend on how extensively lenders engage in relationship lending. As de…ned in the banking literature, relationship lending is the provision of credit by intermediaries that acquire proprietary information about their borrowers over multiple interactions. 2 Neither the banking nor the macroeconomics literature, however, has fully examined the aggregate implications of such contracts. In this paper, I attempt to bridge the gap by studying the e¤ects of relationship lending on the transmission of monetary policy.
That relationship lending and monetary transmission are linked is supported by recent empirical evidence. Across the major European economies, Ehrmann et al (2001) establish that relationship lending is very prevalent in Germany and Italy but not in Spain and
France. Incidentally, they also …nd that the quantity of bank loans responds less severely to a monetary contraction in the …rst two countries than in the last two. A similar pattern obtains on the pricing side. Borio and Fritz (1995) , for example, …nd that increases in central bank policy rates translate more slowly into loan rate increases in Germany and
Italy than in Spain. 3 Moreover, based on U.S. survey data, Berger and Udell (1995) conclude that American borrowers with larger banking relationships pay lower interest rates and are less likely to pledge collateral. Taken together, these studies support the contention that relationship lending changes the way credit responds to monetary shocks. That this change 1 Perhaps most pointedly, Bernanke (1983) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue that …nancial disruption propelled a potentially normal-course recession into the Great Depression. For a survey of the literature on real-…nancial interactions in business cycles, see Gertler (1988) . For a discussion of real-…nancial interactions in economic development, see King and Levine (1993) .
2 See Boot (2000) for an overview of relationship banking. 3 Additional support for the impact of relationship lending is provided for Italy by Gambacorta (2004) and for Germany by Weth (2002) and Iacoviello and Minetti (2008). ultimately …gures in the transmission process is evidenced by the Mojon and Peersman (2003) …nding that the peak decline in investment following a monetary contraction is smaller in Germany and Italy than in Spain and France.
While the empirical evidence is informative, it does not establish causality from relationship lending to monetary transmission. To tackle this issue, I construct a credit-based production model with a continuum of borrower types who di¤er in their potential for successful operation. Types are private information unless successive periods of …nancing are obtained from the same lender, in which case that lender becomes more informed about his borrower. Other lenders are not privy to this information but they can update their beliefs based on default history. On one hand, informed lenders know how their borrowers will respond to credit terms so they may o¤er better loan packages to induce the selection of safer projects. On the other hand though, informed lenders have an advantage over other …nanciers so they may be able to extract some informational rents from their clients. I es- The results provide a theoretical basis for cross-country transmission di¤erences via a relationship lending channel. First, I …nd that su¢ ciently good borrowers enter into lending relationships and, over intermediate ranges of the policy rate, their loan rates are policyinvariant and preferable to the terms o¤ered by uninformed lenders. Second, competition among lenders for future relationship pro…ts alleviates some of the tightness that could otherwise arise in the market for new borrowers. On average then, the informational properties of relationship lending lead to improved credit terms and economies that can sustain these relationships have a smoother steady state output pro…le. Lastly, I …nd that distributional dynamics are generated if relationship lending fosters lower exit rates among good …rms and, for certain monetary shocks, the aggregate output response is more gradual.
As noted above, macroeconomists have explored how …nancial frictions a¤ect the propagation of shocks. In Williamson (1987) , the intermediation costs stemming from private information create a credit rationing e¤ect and, in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , the dependence of these costs on net worth amplify business cycles. Moreover, in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , the collateral constraints necessitated by limited commitment propagate shocks through asset prices. These models, however, abstract from multi-period credit relationships so some work has also been done to examine the implications of long-term credit contracts. In Gertler (1992) , for example, on-going relationships matter because they permit debt rescheduling and make credit constraints dependent on both current and expected future pro…ts. Alternatively, in Khan and Ravikumar (2001) and Smith and Wang (2006) , long-term contracts are used to give borrowers intertemporal incentives to report truthfully. This paper di¤ers from these models in two respects. First, the key feature of multi-period lending relationships in my model is learning and, in particular, the informational advantage of an inside lender over all other lenders. Second, unlike most models of dynamic contracting, I assume that borrowers are unable to commit ex ante to long-term contracts. Multi-period lending relationships in my model are thus a sequence of one-period arrangements whose bene…ts are derived from the possibility of lender learning. Multiple periods are important here both because they permit learning and because learning has long-term implications. This contrasts with the growth model of Bose and Cothren (1997) where lenders invest in learning about borrowers but the information acquired cannot be used in future contracts since agents are two-period-lived overlapping generations who only enter into credit contracts in their …rst period. This paper is also related to the banking literature on relationship lending and, in particular, Schmeits (2005) and Van Tassel (2002) who examine properties of these relationships.
However, neither study analyzes how policy rates a¤ect the resulting contracts or how these contracts then transmit shocks to the macroeconomy. My paper extends their work in three major dimensions. First, I set up a model to analyze precisely these issues. Second, I consider a continuum of borrower types, permitting non-degenerate lender beliefs and continuous output functions. Third, I allow for di¤erent …rm exit rates since the improved credit terms a¤orded by relationship lending may alter the ability of some borrowers to overcome adverse, idiosyncratic events. Along with extending both papers in these ways, my model bears additional di¤erences from each one individually. First, like Schmeits (2005 ) but unlike Van Tassel (2002 , the …rst period credit market is competitive. Second, like Van Tassel (2002) but unlike Schmeits (2005) , borrowers can choose a di¤erent project each period and all lenders can condition their second period loan rates on …rst period default history. Combining these elements allows me to explore more avenues through which relationship lending can in ‡uence real activity.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the environment in more detail, Section 3 analyzes the baseline model, Section 4 extends it, and Section 5 concludes.
Environment
Time is discrete. All agents are in…nitely-lived, risk neutral, and have discount factor 2 (0; 1). There is a continuum of …rm types, denoted by ! 2 [0; 1] and distributed according to a non-degenerate probability density function f ( ). All …rms have access to the same production technologies: an investment project (P1 ) and a speculative project (P2 ). Types are private information and high-! …rms are better in the sense that they are more likely to operate the investment project successfully. In particular, a type ! who operates P1 is able to produce 1 units of output with probability p (!) and zero units with probability 1 p (!), where p : [0; 1] ! [0; 1] is a continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing function. In contrast, the outcome of P2 is independent of …rm type, yielding 2 with probability q and zero with probability 1 q. Assume 2 > 1 and q 2 = p (0) 1 so that the speculative project is riskier in the sense that it is second order stochastically dominated by the investment project. 4 The presence of a speculative outside option allows the credit contracts described below to a¤ect real activity by changing the relative attractiveness of safe projects.
To undertake either project, …rms need one unit of capital. Project output is not storable so capital must be borrowed from a measure of ex ante identical lenders that also populates the economy. Since central bank policy rates determine the tightness of interbank markets, the policy rate enters the model as the lenders'cost of funds, r. 5 Lenders cannot operate production technologies but they are endowed with an ability to learn about the borrowers they lend to. In particular, a lender who has provided credit to a borrower in the past knows more about that borrower than do all the other lenders. Label the informed or relationship lender an insider and the other lenders outsiders. I abstract from the process through which insiders acquire information, summarizing it instead by a positive probability of type discovery. Outsiders are not privy to the information gathered by insiders. To avoid situations where insiders design credit contracts to distort the beliefs of outsiders, assume that outsiders are also not privy to an insider's o¤er when they make their own o¤ers. They do, however, …nd out if the borrower defaulted on a past loan and can revise their beliefs about the borrower's type conditional on this information.
6
Firms can borrow from one lender at a time while lenders can take on more than one borrower. Borrowers cannot commit to long-term contracts though, inducing a sequence of one-period credit arrangements and limiting the scope for intertemporal incentives à la Townsend (1982) . 7 Contracts are characterized by a loan rate so there is no quantity rationing in the model.
There are two notions of time: dates t = 1; 2; ::: denote time in the general economy while 5 Essentially, lenders who need more capital can obtain it at the interbank rate while lenders who have enough capital interpret the rate as an opportunity cost.
6 This is the only cost of default in the model. If the borrower is also forced to wait a few periods before his next contract, the marginal type that chooses the risky project may fall but the qualitative conclusions of the model are unlikely to change.
7 Note that the scope is limited but not necessarily eliminated. In the environment of Section 4, for example, …rst period defaulters are charged higher loan rates the next time around so there is e¤ectively an intertemporal punishment for choosing the riskier project. However, the punishment is not complete since uncommitted borrowers can switch to another lender and this new lender may not …nd it optimal to punish default as much as the original lender would have liked.
periods k = 1; 2; ::: denote time in the credit market. At any date t, …rst-time (i.e., k = 1) borrowers enter the market with private information about their types. All lenders have the same priors about a new borrower so this borrower chooses randomly among perfectly competitive lenders. Based on his type and the loan rate charged, the borrower then chooses which project to undertake. At the end of date t, project outcomes are realized and debts are settled. Capital is not destroyed in the production process so the borrowed unit is always recovered by the lender. Interest payments, however, can only be made by borrowers with successful projects. Lenders cannot observe the exact output of a project but can detect the presence of consumption so borrowers settle interest payments if and only if their projects are successful. Default occurs when a borrower cannot pay interest. Since this happens when his project yields no output, the probability of default is just the probability of project failure.
Also at the end of date t, a lender learns the type of his …rst-time borrower with probability 2 (0; 1]. To simplify the exposition, I take = 1. All other lenders learn whether or not the borrower defaulted on his …rst period loan. The borrower then moves to date t + 1 and becomes a second-time (i.e., k = 2) borrower. Conditional on their cost of funds and their beliefs about the borrower's type, lenders set their second period loan rates simultaneously. 8 Since insiders and outsiders have di¤erent information sets, the borrower no longer chooses among perfectly competitive lenders. After receiving all o¤ers, the borrower decides which contract to accept and which project to then undertake. Once again, project outcomes are realized and debts are settled.
At the end of date t + 1, the types of all second-time borrowers are made public. This is done to avoid carrying credit history throughout the model and, therefore, to keep the state space …nite. Also starting at the end of the borrower's second period is a positive probability that he is exogenously separated from the credit market. This separation eliminates all information about him and requires that he draw a new type and re-enter the market as a …rst-time borrower in t + 2. In contrast, types that are not separated become thirdtime borrowers in t + 2. As before, loan rates are determined, lenders and projects chosen, outcomes realized, and debts settled. Borrowers who do not survive separation at the end of their third period must start anew while borrowers who do survive it become fourth-time borrowers in t + 3 and face the same environment they did in t + 2. The market continues in this way and, even though information is revealed after two periods, the possibility of exogenous separation ensures that there are always …rst-time, second-time, and advanced (i.e., k 3) borrowers at any date t.
The three borrower classes can be interpreted as an approximation of the borrower life cycle. When a borrower …rst enters the credit market, little is known about him so k = 1 re ‡ects the market for new borrowers. In contrast, after su¢ ciently many realizations of the borrower's credit history, all lenders can form precise beliefs about his type so k 3 approximates the market for established borrowers. k = 2 captures the intermediate market:
after enough time has elapsed for lending relationships to inform insiders but before enough time has elapsed for credit history to inform outsiders.
Baseline Model
The baseline model is as described in Section 2 with an exogenous separation probability of 2 (0; 1) for all borrowers. Since separation rates are independent of lender selection, the insider's only advantage over an outsider is informational. This assumption will be relaxed in Section 4. Let us now examine the recursive equilibrium of the baseline model. In what follows, the value of a lender with cost r and information set about a period k borrower is denoted by J k (rj ). His optimal o¤er is then denoted by R k (rj ).
Advanced Borrowers (k 3)
Since the types of advanced borrowers are public, the problem is one of perfect information for k 3. Project choice does not a¤ect future outcomes as borrowers either start anew with exogenous probability or continue to period k + 1 with exogenous probability 1 .
Consequently, each borrower will choose the project that yields him a higher expected return in the current period. A trade-o¤ arises, however, since P1 generates more expected revenue but also increases the likelihood of interest payments. At high loan rates then, the borrower may have an incentive to choose the riskier project. Formally, the borrower's optimal strategy is de…ned relative to a threshold loan rate. For a type ! borrower, the one-period return to
The loan rate that makes him indi¤erent between the two projects is:
where
and P2 otherwise. I summarize this strategy as follows:
Given the borrower's project strategy, lenders choose the loan rate. 9 With probability , lenders in k 3 are separated from their borrowers and must start the next period with a …rst-timer. All lenders have the same information set in k = 1 so competition forces expected pro…ts there to zero. Symmetric information in periods k 3 also means zero pro…ts. The expected revenue of an informed lender who charges his type ! borrower R is thus (Rj!) R. It is easy to see that the highest sustainable loan rate is 2 : anything above 2 and the borrower will not want to undertake either project. For loan rates less than or equal to 2 , the lender's optimized revenue function is illustrated in Figure 1 .
=q and note that the optimal revenue function is discontinuous 9 Since an advanced borrower operates in an environment of perfect information and homogeneous separation rates, he attracts the same o¤er from every lender and is thus indi¤erent among them. Without loss of generality, I complete the borrower's strategy by assuming that he stays with his second period lender for all k 3.
at R (!) because loan rates between R (!) and b R (!) are dominated by R (!). To see why,
consider the expected revenue associated with charging R (!) versus R (!) + for > 0. At R (!), the borrower chooses P1 and the lender receives p (!) R (!) while, at R (!) + , he chooses P2 and the lender receives q R (!) + . The second expression is less than the …rst for any between 0 and (p (!) q) R (!) =q > 0 so R (!) dominates any loan rate between R (!) and b R (!). In equilibrium, competition forces (Rj!) R = r so we can re-interpret the vertical axis in Figure 1 as the policy rate. With loan rates capped at 2 , the policy rate is capped at q 2 . Moreover, re ‡ecting over the 45 line so that r is on the horizontal yields:
Both p (!) and R (!) are strictly increasing functions so, consistent with their more costly nature, lower types are charged higher loan rates over wider ranges of r.
To determine the total output of k 3 borrowers under these rates, I de…ne type e ! (r)
as follows:
The monotonicity of p (!) R (!) implies that equation (4) has a unique solution and, for all ! < e ! (r), we have p (!) R (!) < r. Therefore, we can use the lender strategy in equation (3) to conclude that all types below e ! (r) are charged R k 3 (rj!) > R (!) and the borrower strategy in equation (2) to conclude that these types then choose P2. In a similar manner, it can be shown that all types above e ! (r) choose P1. Normalized by population, the total output of advanced borrowers is thus:
With e ! 0 (r) > 0 and p (x) 1 > q 2 for x 2 (0; 1], equation (5) de…nes an output function that is decreasing in the policy rate.
Intermediate Borrowers (k = 2)
In the second period, …rst period credit histories are made public. Denote default by d = D and non-default by d = N . While this is the only information observed by outside lenders, an insider also learns his borrower's type before making an o¤er. This type is revealed to outsiders at the end of k = 2 though so the borrower's future outcomes are independent of current project choice and the optimal strategy of a type ! borrower is still given by (Rj!).
As discussed in Section 2, the game between second period lenders is simultaneous.
Consider …rst an insider who has discovered that his borrower is type !. With competition driving future pro…ts to zero, the insider's expected revenue is just (Rj!) R as illustrated in Figure 1 . Now, however, the insider has an informational advantage over all other lenders so competition will not necessarily eliminate current pro…ts. Noting that the insider can charge above the outsider rate and lose the borrower, his value is:
Below R (!), the insider's revenue is strictly increasing in R. Therefore, if R 2 (rjd) R (!),
. The insider will either o¤er R = R (!) and induce the selection of P1, o¤er R = R 2 (rjd) and induce the selection of P2, or o¤er R > R 2 (rjd) and lose the borrower. Without loss of generality, I assume that insiders only keep borrowers who net them positive expected pro…t. 10 Proposition 1 establishes that the second period credit market splits neatly between insiders and outsiders. In particular, lending relationships are formed with better borrowers, consistent with the empirical prediction of Memmel et al (2007) that high quality …rms are more likely to choose relationship lenders.
is a threshold borrower type that satis…es
Proof. See Appendix A.
Consider now an outsider who has attracted a k = 2 borrower. Represent his beliefs about the borrower's type by a cumulative distribution function, b
according to Bayes'rule. Whatever the borrower's type, it will be known to everyone next period so future pro…ts will be competed away. The expected pro…t of an outsider who charges his class d borrower R d is thus:
In equilibrium, the outsider's beliefs will depend on R d . Moreover, all outsiders must have the same beliefs so competition also drives (7) down to zero. Proposition 2 summarizes the outcome of the game between second period lenders:
Proposition 2 When k = 2, outside lenders o¤er R 2 (rjd) = r=q and get ! 2 [0; e ! (r)].
Inside lenders keep ! 2 (e ! (r) ; 1] and o¤er:
where e ! (r) is as de…ned in equation (4) and b ! (r) arg min
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 establishes two important results. First, when the insider discovers his borrower's type with certainty (i.e., = 1), default history does not matter and the perfect information level of output is achieved. Second, instead of the monotonically increasing function of r that would arise in a pooled equilibrium, relationship lenders charge their borrowers a ‡at rate over certain ranges of the policy rate.
The adverse selection problem faced by competitive outsiders is key for the …rst result.
Insiders want to keep the best types and, since outsiders cannot observe insider o¤ers before making their own, no inferences about type can be made based on loan rates. For each default class then, outsiders know that they will attract the bottom of the distribution so they o¤er r=q, the maximum competitive rate. This rate is above R (!) for ! < b ! (r) so, instead of matching the outsider and inducing P2, the insider can o¤er these borrowers R (!) and induce P1. Given equation (4), e ! (r) is the lowest type for which undercutting the outsider is pro…table and, with b ! (r) > e ! (r), the perfect information level of output can be achieved. This would not be the case with < 1 though since < 1 implies a positive probability that no one is informed about the borrower's type in k = 2, making credit history the only piece of information available to the market and eliminating the adverse selection problem.
The second result from Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 2 (a). Details on the construction of the …gure are provided in Appendix C. Consider type ! A as shown on the vertical axis. If r > r B , then ! A falls below e ! (r) and the borrower moves to an outsider. If r r B , then ! A stays with his insider and, for policy rates between r A and r B , he is charged his reservation loan rate. For policy rates below r A , the insider charges him r=q but ! A is su¢ ciently high that this rate is less than R (! A ). Notice the role of relationship lending here: by revealing type to the insider, it allows him to gauge how much can be extracted from the borrower without inducing the risky project. In equilibrium, policy rates between r A and r B are such that the insider pro…ts from using information generated by his lending relationship with ! A to undercut the outsiders. The shaded region in Figure 2 (a) illustrates that the length of the interval over which a borrower is charged his reservation rate is increasing in the borrower's type. Figure 2 (a) also demonstrates that the proportion of types charged their reservation rate as a result of relationship lending exhibits a hump-shaped response to increases in the policy rate (i.e., the vertical distance between e ! (r) and b ! (r) rises then falls). As r increases, the marginal type on which an insider breaks even rises so the fraction of borrowers admitted into lending relationships falls. Within the group of relationship borrowers, however, the insider wants to increase the marginal type that he undercuts on. Initially, the second e¤ect dominates the …rst and the vertical distance rises but, eventually, the …rst e¤ect dominates the second and the vertical distance falls.
Before proceeding to k = 1, let us elaborate on the role of outsiders in these results. The free entry of other lenders forces the insider to solve a constrained optimization problem and, with monopoly rents precluded, insiders choose to tailor contracts around reservation rates in the manner discussed above. 11 The absence of monopoly rents, however, does not mean the absence of all rents: equation (4) 
New Borrowers (k = 1)
Recall from Proposition 2 that the second period equilibrium does not depend on default history when = 1. Therefore, the reservation rate of a …rst-time borrower is still R (!) and his project strategy is once again (Rj!) as de…ned in equation (2). Moreover, the d's drop out of equation (6) and the insider's valuation of a second period contract with a type 11 In other words, competition prevents the borrower from being informationally captured and, as in Schmeits (2005) , mitigates the hold-up problem. The result that competition can help sustain a mutually bene…cial second-period credit contract contrasts somewhat with the Petersen and Rajan (1995) argument that concentration increases the value of lending relationships. Therefore, consistent with Cao and Shi (2001) , the treatment of information appears critical in analyzing interactions between credit market structure and credit market outcomes. 12 To the extent that ability and assets are positively correlated, the distribution of assets can be viewed as one approximation of the distribution of types.
! borrower can be written as J 2 (rj!). Assuming that the current policy rate is the best predictor of the future policy rate, …rst period lenders obtain the following expected pro…t from charging their borrowers R 1 :
Let R 1 (r) denote the equilibrium …rst period loan rate and de…ne type (r) such that R ( (r)) = R 1 (r).
13 By this de…nition, all types above (r) choose P1 and all types below it choose P2. Since competition between identically uninformed lenders drives (9) down to zero, (r) is characterized by:
where equation (6) and Proposition 2 can be used to substitute out J 2 (rjx). Normalized by population, total …rst period output is then:
Further discussion of (r) and Y 1 (r) is deferred until Subsection 3.5. For now though, note that a continuous function over a compact set has at least one argmin and, as demonstrated in Appendix C, the argmin that de…nes (r) is unique and non-decreasing under the following regulatory conditions:
Assumption 3 p 00 ( ) is su¢ ciently low Assumption 4 p (1) 2q
13 If R 1 (r) > R (1), then (r) is corner at 1.
Assumption 1 precludes the economy from having a disproportionately large group of high types. It is a relatively innocuous assumption, satis…ed by both uniform and truncated normal distributions over the unit interval. In Section 2, we imposed p (0) > q so Assumption 2 just restricts the margin by which p (0) exceeds q. Assumption 3 says that p ( ) is either concave, linear, or mildly convex. In other words, while the probability of succeeding in the investment project increases with …rm type, it does not increase exponentially. Finally, Assumption 4 regulates the outside option by putting a lower bound on q.
Aggregate Output
There are new, intermediate, and advanced borrowers at any date t so we must determine the distribution of borrowers across periods in order to calculate aggregate output. Without loss of generality, set the population size to one and let 1;t , 2;t , and k 3;t denote the proportions of period 1, 2, and k 3 borrowers at date t. Aggregate output can then be written as:
where Y 1 (r) and Y 2 (r) = Y k 3 (r) are given by equations (11) and (5) respectively. With the possibility of exogenous separation beginning at the end of the second period, the distribution evolves according to:
Substituting k 3;t into the expression for 1;t+1 , the evolution of 1 is determined by a one-dimensional di¤erence equation and, with 2 (0; 1), the entire system is asymptotically stable. Therefore, starting from any initial distribution, the proportions converge to 1 = 2 = 1+ and k 3 = 1 1+
. Steady state aggregate output is thus:
Moreover, the extent of relationship lending is captured by (1 e ! (r)) = (1 + ) and is decreasing in the policy rate and the rate of exogenous separation.
Discussion
To better appreciate the e¤ect of relationship lending, it will be instructive to compare the results of the baseline model to those of a standard credit channel model where exogenous separation occurs with certainty every period and private information is never revealed. In this context, a representative lender's expected pro…t from charging R S is
Competition drives this expression down to zero and yields an equilibrium loan rate denoted by R S (r). De…ning type (r) such that R ( (r)) = R S (r), the solution to the standard model and the resulting output function are characterized by equations (13) and (14) respectively:
(r) arg min
Let us now investigate the macroeconomic implications of relationship lending by comparing (r), e ! (r), and (r). The key properties are derived in Appendix C and illustrated in Figure 2 (b). The implied output functions are then shown in Figure 3 (a).
14
Begin with e ! (r) and (r). Aside from the corners, (r) only intersects e ! (r) once.
Moreover, (r) approaches this intersection from below e ! (r). Given the output functions in equations (5) and (14), we can then conclude that Y S (r) is greater than Y k 3 (r) for low policy rates but less than Y k 3 (r) otherwise. The di¤erence between Y k 3 (r) and Y S (r) is 14 Since all output functions were normalized by population, they are directly comparable.
intuitive. At low policy rates, informed lenders can grant favourable credit terms (i.e., loan rates low enough to induce P1 ) to more types without su¤ering a loss. The same is true for uninformed lenders in the standard model but, since they can only o¤er a pooled rate, some of the lower types who would not otherwise receive favourable terms now do. In contrast, when the cost of funds is su¢ ciently high, this mechanism has the opposite e¤ect, yielding S (r) > e ! (r) and Y S (r) < Y k 3 (r). As established in Subsection 3.2, relationship lending pushes Y 2 (r) towards Y k 3 (r) so the …rst macroeconomic impact of these relationships is a less severe second period output pro…le relative to the standard model.
Consider now (r) and (r). Aside from the corners, (r) does not intersect (r).
Instead, (r) < (r) which implies Y 1 (r) > Y S (r). Therefore, even though the …rst period of the baseline model is characterized by the same information frictions as the standard one, it generates higher output. To see why, note that …rst period lenders compete more …ercely for borrowers in anticipation of the second period insider pro…ts a¤orded by relationship lending. As a result, the pooled rate is driven down further, a greater number of types opt for P1, and the second macroeconomic impact of relationship lending is an improvement in …rst period output relative to the standard model. This e¤ect is most pronounced over moderate policy rates since very high values of r are associated with few lending relationships while very low values of r provide only limited scope for further reductions in the pooled rate.
Aggregate results are illustrated in Figure 3 (b) and we can conclude that relationship lending leads to a smoother steady state aggregate output pro…le. With a higher probability of exogenous separation, there is a greater mass of …rst-time borrowers and the bene…ts of relationship lending are more visible at moderate policy rates. In contrast, lower separation probabilities push Y (r) towards Y k 3 (r) and magnify the bene…ts of relationship lending at higher policy rates. To see that the conclusion is not just a product of the timing of exogenous separation in the baseline model or the fact that information is eventually revealed to all lenders, suppose that exogenous separation occurs with probability at the end of the …rst period and probability 1 at the end of the second. The k = 2 problem is unchanged so Y 2 (r) still equals the perfect information level of output. The k = 1 problem is slightly di¤erent since the second term in equation (9) 
Extended Model
The results of Section 3 suggest that, on average, the informational properties of relationship lending lead to improved credit terms. In reality though, borrowers with improved terms may be better able to overcome adverse idiosyncratic events that would have otherwise put them out of business. Along with learning then, relationship lending may also foster lower …rm exit rates. To understand the implications of this possibility, I extend the baseline model. In particular, as long as a borrower stays with his insider, he experiences exogenous separation with probability ", where " > 0. If or once he switches to an outsider, separation occurs with probability .
The di¤erence in separation rates has two important implications. First, it gives insiders more bargaining power over high types. A separated borrower must draw a new type and re-enter the credit market as a …rst-timer so separation is very costly for high-! …rms.
By supporting a lower exit rate, insiders can now charge slightly above the outsider o¤er without losing these borrowers. Second, the presence of " > 0 allows us to consider transition dynamics. The policy rate a¤ects which borrowers enter into lending relationships so, when separation rates di¤er between insiders and outsiders, the policy rate will also a¤ect the distribution of borrowers across periods. Let us now set up the extended model more formally.
Value Functions
Outsiders still compete against each other and make zero expected pro…ts so their k 3 and k = 2 value functions are of the same form as those in Subsections 3.1 and 3.2. In contrast, the k = 2 value function of an insider is now:
where V 2;I (!jR) is the value of a second-time type ! borrower who stays with his insider and pays loan rate R while V 2;U (!jR 2;U;d ) is the value of this borrower should he move to an outsider charging R 2;U;d . The insider's value function for any k 3 is also given by the right hand side of equation (15) but with V k 3;I (!jR) V k 3;U (!jR k 3;U;! ) as the borrower's participation constraint.
For the baseline model (i.e., " = 0), it was proven that second-time borrowers are not divided according to default history. In the absence of an analytical solution for the extended model, there is no presumption that this is still the case. Therefore, second period loan rates are not restricted to be history-independent and the …rst period borrower strategy is now denoted by 1 (Rj!) to distinguish it from (Rj!). The value function of a …rst period lender is then similar to equation (9) except that 1 ( ) is used instead of ( ) and expected future pro…ts are determined using equation (15) and the market splitting that results.
Consider now the borrower side. For a …rst-time borrower facing loan rate R, the expected payo¤s associated with choosing P1 and P2 are given by (16) and (17) respectively: 
where V 2 (!jR 2;I;d ; R 2;U;d ) = max fV 2;I (!jR 2;I;d ) ; V 2;U (!jR 2;U;d )g is the borrower's second period value function. His …rst period value, V 1 (!jR), is given by the maximum of (16) and (17) and his strategy is 1 (Rj!) = p (!) if and only if (16) is greater than (17). Finally, to determine V 2 (!jR 2;I;d ; R 2;U;d ), note that:
Transition Dynamics
Suppose an unanticipated permanent increase in r occurs at date t. Lenders with advanced borrowers can adjust immediately to the new steady state but this may not be true for lenders with intermediate borrowers.
Recall that the only piece of information available to a second period outsider is whether the borrower defaulted on his …rst period loan and, at date t, this outcome depends on loan rates induced by the t 1 policy rate. In the insider's problem, however, expected future pro…ts depend on loan rates induced by the t + 1 policy rate. Since an equilibrium is reached when each lender's o¤er is a best response to the other's, the second period loan rates that prevail at date t depend on both pre-shock and post-shock policy rates. In contrast, the post-shock steady state is conditioned entirely on the post-shock policy rate so the k = 2 equilibrium at date t may di¤er from the new k = 2 steady state.
To determine how long it takes to reach the new steady state, consider the market for new borrowers. If …rst period lenders at date t expect a full adjustment by date t + 1, then they will adjust immediately. As a result, both outsider information and insider pro…ts at date t + 1 will be conditioned on the new policy rate. This means that the k = 2 equilibrium will reach the new steady state by date t + 1, consistent with the time t expectations of …rst period lenders. In what follows, I focus on this case. That is, all contracts adjust to the new steady state by date t + 1. 16 Note, however, that even with a quick contract response, the e¤ects of the policy rate shock continue to be propagated through the distribution. We can see this by formalizing the borrower ‡ows. Let I 2;d;t (!) be an indicator function that equals 1 if a second-time borrower with type ! and default history d stays with his insider at date t.
Similarly, de…ne I k 3;t (!) so that I k 3;t (!) = 1 if V k 3;I (!jR k 3;I;!;t ) V k 3;U (!jR k 3;U;!;t ).
The mass of k = 1 borrowers at date t + 1 is now:
2;I;t (x) + k 3;I;t (x) dx + R 1 0 2;U;t (x) + k 3;U;t (x) dx where 2;I;t ( ) is the distribution of borrower types across k = 2 insiders and 2;U;t ( ) is the distribution of borrower types across k = 2 outsiders. The corresponding distributions for k 3 are denoted by k 3;I;t ( ) and k 3;U;t ( ). The laws of motion for these distributions are as follows: Shocks to the policy rate a¤ect the terms o¤ered by various lenders and changes in these terms then a¤ect which borrowers choose to stay with their insiders (i.e., I 2;N , I 2;D , and I k 3 respond). When " is positive, types that stay with their insiders become more persistent so changes in r alter the distribution of borrower types in and across periods. As these distributions evolve to their new steady states, aggregate dynamics are observed well beyond time t.
Numerical Analysis
To compute the equilibrium quantities, discretize the type space and the set of possible loan rates and initialize the loan rate functions and the value functions. Given the loan rates, I determine the borrowers'strategies by iterating on their value functions then, based on these strategies, I iterate on the loan rates to …nd the optimal lender responses. The equilibrium is determined by iterating on the outer loop until the starting and ending loan rate functions converge.
To execute the iterations, I set = 0:96 and use a uniform distribution of types. Returns are 1 = 5 and 2 = 6 so that the speculative project yields 20 percent more than the investment project if successful. The probability of success for the investment project is assumed to be linear in borrower type, satisfying p (!) = p (0) + [p (1) p (0)] !. By de…nition, the best type is very likely to succeed if he operates P1 so I set p(1) = 0:9. The success rate of the speculative project is much lower but, since it still needs to be a legitimate outside option, I consider q = 0:65. With values for q, 1 , and 2 , we can then use p(0) 1 = q 2 to pin down p (0) = 0:78. Unless otherwise speci…ed, = 0:3 and " = 0:065. A higher policy rate increases the cost of lending so, all else constant, the lowest type on which the insider breaks even rises. As before then, insiders become more selective in their retention of borrowers and fewer lending relationships are formed. Now, however, the additional bargaining power that " gives the insider over better types means that more of the necessary break even can be accommodated by increases in the loan rate, stemming the restriction of insider credit. The bargaining power e¤ect plays out initially but is eventually dominated by the selectivity e¤ect, leading to the hump-shaped response in relationship lending.
The bargaining and selectivity e¤ects are also useful for understanding why credit history can matter with " > 0. At higher policy rates, the increase in insider selectivity means that more types have to resort to outsider credit. This increases outsider uncertainty and makes credit history a natural screening mechanism. The informativeness of credit history, however, depends on the …rst period loan rate. In particular, a very high R 1 induces most types to choose P2 in the …rst period and implies high default probabilities across the board. The opposite is true when R 1 is very low. Therefore, by getting good …rms to choose P1 and bad …rms to choose P2, moderate …rst period loan rates generate the most informative credit histories. For credit history to matter then, we need a relatively high value of r but a relatively moderate value of R 1 . This con…guration can be achieved under " > 0 since the bargaining power a¤orded to insiders over high types increases the expectation of future pro…ts and, for any r, competitive …rst period lenders settle on a lower value of R 1 . To be sure, adverse selection still arises with " > 0 but, for relatively high policy rates, the informativeness of credit history is such that d cannot be completely crowded out.
Dynamics
Consider now the transition between steady states after an increase in the policy rate at date t. As shown in Figure 5 , the initial response of relationship lending tends to overshoot its new steady state value. To see why, de…ne the extensive margin in period k as the total number of borrowers in that period and the intensive margin as the proportion of these borrowers that enter into multi-period lending relationships. The extent of relationship lending in any given period is approximately equal to the product of its intensive and extensive margins. 17 The extent of relationship lending at any given date is then equal to the sum of the extents for periods 2 and above. The right panel of Figure 4 (c) reveals that k = 2 is critical for the analysis. When r increases from 0:5 to 0:75, the bargaining power e¤ect drives up the second period intensive margin and we observe the immediate increase in relationship lending shown in Figure 5 (a). Over time though, more lending relationships mean fewer exogenous separations so the distribution of borrowers eventually shifts away from k = 2 and the extent of relationship lending declines along the transition path. Therefore, the increase in relationship lending overshoots its new steady state and the decrease in output undershoots. As set up at the beginning of Subsection 3.5, the standard model adjusts to its new steady state immediately so the results presented here suggest that relationship lending leads to a more gradual transition after certain monetary shocks.
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In comparison, Figure 5 (b) demonstrates that an increase in the policy rate from 0:75 to 1 causes the decrease in output to overshoot. For this range of r, the insider's selectivity e¤ect dominates, pushing the second period intensive margin back down. As the immediate 17 The result is an approximation for the second period since it aggregates across default histories. 18 This is not to say that traditional models do not generate dynamics. Instead, the transitions presented here should be interpreted as dynamics over and above those generated by a model that ignores relationship lending. decrease in relationship lending eventually increases the number of young borrowers (i.e., the pool of potential relationship borrowers), the initial declines in relationship lending and output are partially o¤set over time. Even at its trough, however, aggregate output in Figure   5 (b) exceeds the standard credit model's new steady state of Y S (1) 4:16.
Conclusion
This paper has constructed a credit-based model of production to examine how relationship lending a¤ects the monetary transmission mechanism. I analyzed how monetary policy changes the incentives of borrowers and lenders to engage in lending relationships and how these changes then shape the response of aggregate output. I …nd that su¢ ciently good borrowers enter into lending relationships and, over intermediate ranges of the policy rate, their loan rates are policy-invariant and preferable to the terms o¤ered by uninformed lenders.
In addition, competition among lenders for future relationship pro…ts alleviates some of the tightness that could otherwise arise in the market for new borrowers. On average then, the informational properties of relationship lending lead to improved credit terms and economies that can sustain these relationships have a smoother steady state output pro…le. Moreover, if the improved credit terms a¤orded by relationship lending also improve the ability of borrowers to overcome adverse, idiosyncratic events, I …nd that the economy experiences a more gradual response to certain monetary shocks. These results provide a theoretical basis for cross-country transmission di¤erences via a relationship lending channel so future work will be directed at calibrations to quantify the e¤ect.
Appendix A Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose types ! 0 and ! 0 + have the same credit history d. Since credit history is the only information that the outsider can condition on, he o¤ers ! 0 and ! 0 + the same loan rate R 2 (rjd). Consider now an insider who …nds it optimal to keep ! 0 . Retaining ! 0 when exogenous separation rates are homogeneous implies that the insider must be charging R 2 (rj! 0 ; d) R 2 (rjd). Moreover, the fact that the insider …nds it optimal to keep ! 0 means that he must be making positive pro…t on this borrower. With > 0 and R 0 (!) > 0, equation (2) establishes that (Rj! 0 + ) (Rj! 0 ) for any R. Therefore, the insider could o¤er ! 0 + loan rate R 2 (rj! 0 ; d), keep him, and make at least as much as he is making on ! 0 . Since ! 0 and were chosen arbitrarily, Proposition 1 follows by induction.
Appendix B Proof of Proposition 2
Let R d (r) denote the as yet undetermined solution to the outsider's problem and de…ne
and all types below it choose P2 so setting (7) to zero yields:
The proof of Proposition 2 proceeds in four steps. First, I prove R 2 (rjd) = r=q. Second, I
prove c d (r) = e ! (r). Third, I establish equation (8).
The following Lemma will be useful for the …rst step:
Proof. Using Bayes'Rule, b F d (x) is given by:
All …rst-time borrowers advance to the second period so the unconditional type distribution is F ( ). Note, however, that Pr (! x) = F (x) =F (c d (r)) since the outsider only gets
, where (r) is the lowest type that chose P1 in the …rst period, then the outsider's beliefs are given by:
On the other hand, if c d (r) > (r), then Bayesian updating yields:
We can now establish R 2 (rjd) = r=q. Given equation (B.1), it will be su¢ cient to show
The proof proceeds by contradiction. In particular, if
is a maximum value function implies 0. By contradiction then, ! d (r) > c d (r) and This is the same equation that de…nes e ! (r), implying c D (r) = c N (r) = e ! (r).
Since we now know that the insider only keeps ! > e ! (r), we can restrict attention to r < p (!) R (!) in order to prove equation (8). Consider …rst r 2 qR (!) ; p (!) R (!) . In this case, the outsider o¤er of R 2 (rjd) = r=q falls between R (!) and b
From Subsection 3.1, we know that an informed lender would rather charge R (!) than any
. Therefore, since the insider cannot charge above R 2 (rjd) and keep the borrower, he charges R 2 (rj!; d) = R (!) and gets J 2 (rj!; d) = p (!) R (!) r > 0. Consider now r qR (!). In this case, the outsider's o¤er falls below the borrower's reservation loan rate and the best the insider can do is match it, yielding R 2 (rj!; d) = r=q and
and r qR (!) corresponds to ! b ! (r) produces R 2 (rj!; d) as in equation (8).
The proof so far has established that all types below e ! (r) move to an outsider and pay R 2 (rjd) > R ( ) while all types above e ! (r) stay with their insiders and pay R 2 (rj ; d) R ( ).
As a result, Y 2 (r) equals Y k 3 (r) as given in equation (5).
Appendix C Construction of Figure 2 (a) Consider …rst b ! (r). At r = 0, we need qR (b ! (0)) = 0 which occurs if and only if
is increasing for r 2 0; qR (1) and equal to 1 for r qR (1). Consider now e ! (r). Once again, r = 0 yields e ! (0) = 0. The fact that p ( ) R ( ) is increasing implies that e ! (r) is increasing for r 2 0; p (1) R (1) and equal to 1 for r p (1) R (1). At policy rate r, the set of types for which an insider charges reservation rates has length jb ! (r) e ! (r)j (i.e., the vertical distance between the b ! (r) and e ! (r) curves).
Since ! 2 (e ! (r) ; b ! (r)) if and only if r 2 qR (!) ; p (!) R (!) , the range of policy rates over which an insider charges type ! his reservation rate has length p (!) R (!) qR (!) (i.e., the horizontal distance between the b ! (r) and e ! (r) curves). Having p (!) > q establishes e ! (r) b ! (r) and having p 0 (!) > 0 establishes
(b) Consider (r). As before, (0) = 0 is immediate. De…ne:
Note that q 2 = p (0) 1 allows us to write:
Since g (0) = 0 and g (!) > 0 for all ! 2 (0; 1], it must be the case that g 0 (0) > 0. Lemma 2 establishes the sign of g 0 (!) over ! 2 (0; 1) under the assumptions in Subsection 3.3:
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1 to 3, g (!) is monotonically increasing over ! 2 (0; 1).
Proof. If the claim is not true, then there must be at least one z 2 (0; 1) such that g 0 (z) = 0. Using the expression for g 0 ( ) presented above, this z is implicitly de…ned by
. Denoting the right side of this equation by h ( ), we can say that g ( ) achieves a local optimum every time it intersects h ( ). In other words, g 0 ( ) switches signs at any z such that g (z) = h (z). Recalling g 0 (0) > 0, it follows that g ( ) begins to decrease after its …rst intersection with h ( ). Under the assumptions, h 0 ( ) > 0 and there can be no further intersections. Therefore, if there is indeed a z 2 (0; 1) such that g (z) = h (z), then we will have g 0 (1) < 0. Taken together, g 0 (1) < 0 and f (1) 1 imply p (0) < q + 2 , violating Assumption 2. As a result, there cannot be a z 2 (0; 1) such that g (z) = h (z) and, by implication, g ( ) must be monotonically increasing over ! 2 (0; 1).
With g (!) increasing, the minimization problem in equation (13) yields only one argmin.
Moreover, (r) is increasing for r 2 0; qR (1) and equal to 1 for r qR (1). Consider now all points such that e ! (r) = (r) = z. Using the de…nitions of e ! (r) and (r), any such z 2 (0; 1) must satisfy p (z) = h R z 0 qdF (!) + R 1 z p (!) dF (!) i u (z). Since u 0 ( ) < 0, p 0 ( ) > 0, u (0) > p (0), and u (1) < p (1), we know that p ( ) and u ( ) intersect only once.
Therefore, there is only one point such that (r) = e ! (r) 2 (0; 1). Since both (r) and e ! (r)
are increasing, this implies that there is only one r 2 0; p (1) R (1) such that (r) = e ! (r).
Moreover, (0) = e ! (0) = 0 and e ! 0 (0) =
approaches its intersection with e ! (r) from below e ! (r).
Consider now (r). We can rewrite equation (10) as:
(r) = arg min
By Lemma 2, g 0 (!) > 0 so this argmin is unique and (0) = 0. Furthermore, (r) de…ned as the argmin of jg ( ) rj and g (1) = qR (1) imply (r) < (r) for all r 2 0; qR (1) .
At r = p (1) R (1) though, e ! (r) = 1 so (r) = (r) = 1. Therefore, (r) reaches 1 for r 2 qR (1) ; p (1) R (1) . Now, using Proposition 2: J 2 (rjx) dF (x) is increasing in r so (r) is also increasing until it reaches 1. Let us now examine all policy rates such that (r) = e ! (r) 2 (0; 1). Using the de…nitions of e ! (r) and (r), any such r must satisfy: < 1 = RHS. Therefore, there is a unique r 2 0; p (1) R (1) such that e ! (r) = (r). Moreover, since (r) (r) and (r) is initially below e ! (r), we know that (r) also approaches its intersection with e ! (r) from below e ! (r).
Note that Assumption 3 also identi…es the curvature of e ! (r). Consider r 2 0; p (1) R (1) .
Di¤erentiating both sides of p (e !) R (e !) = r yields 
